Hypothesis:
Xerxes' notoriety has been achieved due to his military ineptitude and desire for revenge
Focus Questions:
1. How was Xerxes forced into a journey of revenge due to is kingship?
Xerxes is
celebrated for his many building projects throughout his empire but is best
known, in both ancient and modern sources, for the massive expedition he mounted
against Greece in 480 BCE, which, according to Herodotus, assembled the largest
and most well equipped fighting force ever put into the field up to that point.
He was the son of Darius the Great (550-486 BCE) who, in an effort to punish
Athens for their support for the Ionian colonies’ revolt against Persian rule,
had invaded Greece in 492 BCE. However, first
it is important to note that Herodotus did not write during the time of the
Greco-Persian Wars, but within a generation following its conclusion. To preserve events
of the war, it is believed that he collected much of his information from Greek
citizens and eye-witnesses of certain events. It is also believed that
Herodotus has the propensity to embellish and falsify certain events in order
to position the Greeks in a favourable light, thus demonstrating his Greek, and
more particularly, Athenian bias. Thus, such perspective must be made notable when
using significant references to the audacious and intrepid Greek personalities
within Herodotus’ The Histories, as
what may be implied could be a result of the historian’s proclivity to generate
Greek bias, with absence of Persian heroic accounts.
Herodotus suggests that Xerxes allowed himself to be persuaded by Mardonius to undertake the invasion of Greece. Mardonius argued for revenge and also claimed that Greece would be a valuable asset to the king. Messengers from the ruling family in Thrace and members of the Athenian Peisistratid family also urged Xerxes to attack and promised to help him. Another way of analysing Persia’s conflicts with Greece is to see them as part of a much broader long-term plan to incorporate Greece into the Persian Empire. It was suggested within The Histories that it was Xerxes who first thought of this, but the number and nature of earlier Persian expeditions suggest that it may have begun with Darius. Herodotus tells us that Xerxes spent four years mustering troops and assembling provisions of stores and equipment. The Persian forces were recruited from all over the empire:
“There was not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against Greece… Some nations provided ships, others formed infantry units; from some cavalry was requisitioned, from others, again, warships for floating bridges, or provisions and naval craft of various kings.”
Herodotus, 7.23.
The Persian army was an organised and efficient fighting unit. The largest unit in the Persian army was a division as a myriad. The elite myriad of the Persian army was the king’s personal division, the 10,000 specially chosen Immortals. Included within the Immortals was the highest-ranking group of all, the Arstibara, or King’s Spear bearers. Persian battle formations included lines of spearmen armed with shields in front of long lines of archers. During the Persian Wars these lightly armed archers were rarely a match for the heavily armed Greek hoplite phalanx that excelled in close combat. The Persian battle tactic relied on the use of vast numbers of soldiers, advancing in wave after wave against the enemy frontline. The disadvantage of this tactic was that it was more suitable for the open terrain of Persian lands than the mountains and narrow passes of Greece. The major battles of the Second Persian War have been subjects of disagreement among both ancient and modern historians. There is much debate about the exact location of battles, the size of the armies and the exact motives behind many of the actions on both sides. It was not until 481 BCE that the Greeks began to prepare a strategy to respond to Xerxes’ plan to invade Greece.
With the defeat at the Battle of Marathon, Darius and the Persian army returned home and immediately began to organise an even larger expedition to Greece in order to seek revenge for the defeat. During the interim period of ten years, the Persians rectified some of the problems within their empire. In the meantime, the Greek leadership became embroiled in factional fighting that left the ill-prepared to face another Persian invasion. Darius made preparations for a vastly greater attack on Greece when he died in 486 BCE, his son Xerxes inherited the Persian Empire as well as his father’s grudge against the Greeks. Herodotus stated in his ‘Histories’ that the losses of the Persians far surmounted the losses of Athenian men:
“In the Battle of Marathon some 6400 Persian were killed; the losses of the Athenians were 192.”
Herodotus, The Histories, Book 6, 117, translated by A.B. De Selincourt, Penguin Books, London, 2003, P402.
It, therefore, fell to his son to carry out his father’s wishes and, in amassing an army of such size and strength, Xerxes felt confident of his success in achieving what the great Darius had been unable to realise. Traditionally, the defeat of the Persian invasions has been seen as a turning point in European history. Why the Egyptian Revolt occurred is not clear; perhaps the defeat of Persia at Marathon suggested to Xerxes’ subject peoples that the Persian army was not invincible, and that it was a good time to strike for independence. The historian Herodotus portrayed Xerxes as a man of overwhelming pride, whose behaviour was offensive to the gods. What didn’t change in the interwar years was the Persian king’s desire to invade Greece, but this time it was not Darius, but instead his son Xerxes. While Herodotus maintained that just like the First Persian War the second one was based on the Persian king’s desire for revenge, other historians, such as A.B. De Selincourt, argue that it was based on Xerxes desire for personal prestige as well the desire to include Greece in the Persian Empire. While Persia planned its second invasion, the Greeks continued to be racked by rivalry among and within some of the major poleis. In Athens, Miltiades, the hero of the Battle of Marathon, was found guilty in deceiving the Athenian people and exiled from the city. A new hero emerged, Themistocles, who became credited as the builder of the Athenian navy and had enough foresight to realise that another invasion was possible. Xerxes made far-reaching preparations for a fresh attack on Greece. He spent four years recruiting troops from all over the empire.
Xerxes certainly lacked the sensitivity of his predecessors, preferring to rule in his own right rather than through intermediary titles such as ‘King of Babylon’ or ‘Pharaoh of Egypt’, and he may have been impelled not just by revenge, but by a desire to equal by three generations of his family who had all conquered new territories for the empire. It took Xerxes four years to plan and prepare for his massive invasion of Greece. From every corner of the Persian Empire, Xerxes collected vast quantities of food, money and weapons, which he stockpiled for the impending conquest. Meanwhile, the Persian army honed its skills by putting down a rebellion in Egypt. Xerxes’ army was the biggest that had ever been assembled in the ancient world, numbering at least several hundred thousand troops. The army’s strongest regiment was an elite corps of ten thousand hand-picked warriors known as the Immortals. The greater part of the army was, however, drafted from the enslaved masses of the Persian Empire. This army began marching towards Greece in the spring of 480 BC.
Greece was small and relatively unimportant. As long as it did not interfere in Ionian Greek or Persian affairs, it could be ignored. Adding Greece as a satrapy would not greatly add to the size of the Persian Empire nor its wealth. Taking a large expedition into Europe could tempt discontented states with the Persian Empire to rebel. Xerxes was obliged to carry out his father’s plans, to punish Athens for the burning of Sardis and to avenge the Persian defeat at Marathon. Persian prestige would suffer if Athens was not punished. Perhaps Athens’ defeat of Persia at Marathon had promoted the revolts in Egypt and Babylon. Herodotus suggests that Xerxes allowed himself to be persuaded by Mardonius to undertake the invasion of Greece. Mardonius argued for revenge and also claimed that Greece would be a valuable asset to the king. Herodotus is the main source on Xerxes’ reasons for invading Greece, presenting much information in the form of conversations or speeches, which he has created to give his view of events, where he sees a chain in the conflicts between Persia and the Greeks: the attack on Naxos provoked the Ionian Revolt, Athens and Eretria joined the revolt and attacked Sardis, and Mardonius was sent to punish Athens and Eretria but failed when his fleet was wrecked off Mount Athos. The pattern of explanation used by Herodotus is based on the idea of “justified grievance”. The Battle of Marathon, though in itself is comparatively small affair, has always been looked on as one of the decisive battles of the war. Perhaps it was, for it almost certainly saved Greece from being immediately subjugated. It must have given Darius cause for thought, when he was forced to realise that the Greeks, or some of them, unstable, venal, treacherous and self-seeking though they were, were capable on occasion of fighting with great skill and superb courage. Ten years later, Xerxes was to learn the same lesson.
Herodotus suggests that Xerxes allowed himself to be persuaded by Mardonius to undertake the invasion of Greece. Mardonius argued for revenge and also claimed that Greece would be a valuable asset to the king. Messengers from the ruling family in Thrace and members of the Athenian Peisistratid family also urged Xerxes to attack and promised to help him. Another way of analysing Persia’s conflicts with Greece is to see them as part of a much broader long-term plan to incorporate Greece into the Persian Empire. It was suggested within The Histories that it was Xerxes who first thought of this, but the number and nature of earlier Persian expeditions suggest that it may have begun with Darius. Herodotus tells us that Xerxes spent four years mustering troops and assembling provisions of stores and equipment. The Persian forces were recruited from all over the empire:
“There was not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against Greece… Some nations provided ships, others formed infantry units; from some cavalry was requisitioned, from others, again, warships for floating bridges, or provisions and naval craft of various kings.”
Herodotus, 7.23.
The Persian army was an organised and efficient fighting unit. The largest unit in the Persian army was a division as a myriad. The elite myriad of the Persian army was the king’s personal division, the 10,000 specially chosen Immortals. Included within the Immortals was the highest-ranking group of all, the Arstibara, or King’s Spear bearers. Persian battle formations included lines of spearmen armed with shields in front of long lines of archers. During the Persian Wars these lightly armed archers were rarely a match for the heavily armed Greek hoplite phalanx that excelled in close combat. The Persian battle tactic relied on the use of vast numbers of soldiers, advancing in wave after wave against the enemy frontline. The disadvantage of this tactic was that it was more suitable for the open terrain of Persian lands than the mountains and narrow passes of Greece. The major battles of the Second Persian War have been subjects of disagreement among both ancient and modern historians. There is much debate about the exact location of battles, the size of the armies and the exact motives behind many of the actions on both sides. It was not until 481 BCE that the Greeks began to prepare a strategy to respond to Xerxes’ plan to invade Greece.
With the defeat at the Battle of Marathon, Darius and the Persian army returned home and immediately began to organise an even larger expedition to Greece in order to seek revenge for the defeat. During the interim period of ten years, the Persians rectified some of the problems within their empire. In the meantime, the Greek leadership became embroiled in factional fighting that left the ill-prepared to face another Persian invasion. Darius made preparations for a vastly greater attack on Greece when he died in 486 BCE, his son Xerxes inherited the Persian Empire as well as his father’s grudge against the Greeks. Herodotus stated in his ‘Histories’ that the losses of the Persians far surmounted the losses of Athenian men:
“In the Battle of Marathon some 6400 Persian were killed; the losses of the Athenians were 192.”
Herodotus, The Histories, Book 6, 117, translated by A.B. De Selincourt, Penguin Books, London, 2003, P402.
It, therefore, fell to his son to carry out his father’s wishes and, in amassing an army of such size and strength, Xerxes felt confident of his success in achieving what the great Darius had been unable to realise. Traditionally, the defeat of the Persian invasions has been seen as a turning point in European history. Why the Egyptian Revolt occurred is not clear; perhaps the defeat of Persia at Marathon suggested to Xerxes’ subject peoples that the Persian army was not invincible, and that it was a good time to strike for independence. The historian Herodotus portrayed Xerxes as a man of overwhelming pride, whose behaviour was offensive to the gods. What didn’t change in the interwar years was the Persian king’s desire to invade Greece, but this time it was not Darius, but instead his son Xerxes. While Herodotus maintained that just like the First Persian War the second one was based on the Persian king’s desire for revenge, other historians, such as A.B. De Selincourt, argue that it was based on Xerxes desire for personal prestige as well the desire to include Greece in the Persian Empire. While Persia planned its second invasion, the Greeks continued to be racked by rivalry among and within some of the major poleis. In Athens, Miltiades, the hero of the Battle of Marathon, was found guilty in deceiving the Athenian people and exiled from the city. A new hero emerged, Themistocles, who became credited as the builder of the Athenian navy and had enough foresight to realise that another invasion was possible. Xerxes made far-reaching preparations for a fresh attack on Greece. He spent four years recruiting troops from all over the empire.
Xerxes certainly lacked the sensitivity of his predecessors, preferring to rule in his own right rather than through intermediary titles such as ‘King of Babylon’ or ‘Pharaoh of Egypt’, and he may have been impelled not just by revenge, but by a desire to equal by three generations of his family who had all conquered new territories for the empire. It took Xerxes four years to plan and prepare for his massive invasion of Greece. From every corner of the Persian Empire, Xerxes collected vast quantities of food, money and weapons, which he stockpiled for the impending conquest. Meanwhile, the Persian army honed its skills by putting down a rebellion in Egypt. Xerxes’ army was the biggest that had ever been assembled in the ancient world, numbering at least several hundred thousand troops. The army’s strongest regiment was an elite corps of ten thousand hand-picked warriors known as the Immortals. The greater part of the army was, however, drafted from the enslaved masses of the Persian Empire. This army began marching towards Greece in the spring of 480 BC.
Greece was small and relatively unimportant. As long as it did not interfere in Ionian Greek or Persian affairs, it could be ignored. Adding Greece as a satrapy would not greatly add to the size of the Persian Empire nor its wealth. Taking a large expedition into Europe could tempt discontented states with the Persian Empire to rebel. Xerxes was obliged to carry out his father’s plans, to punish Athens for the burning of Sardis and to avenge the Persian defeat at Marathon. Persian prestige would suffer if Athens was not punished. Perhaps Athens’ defeat of Persia at Marathon had promoted the revolts in Egypt and Babylon. Herodotus suggests that Xerxes allowed himself to be persuaded by Mardonius to undertake the invasion of Greece. Mardonius argued for revenge and also claimed that Greece would be a valuable asset to the king. Herodotus is the main source on Xerxes’ reasons for invading Greece, presenting much information in the form of conversations or speeches, which he has created to give his view of events, where he sees a chain in the conflicts between Persia and the Greeks: the attack on Naxos provoked the Ionian Revolt, Athens and Eretria joined the revolt and attacked Sardis, and Mardonius was sent to punish Athens and Eretria but failed when his fleet was wrecked off Mount Athos. The pattern of explanation used by Herodotus is based on the idea of “justified grievance”. The Battle of Marathon, though in itself is comparatively small affair, has always been looked on as one of the decisive battles of the war. Perhaps it was, for it almost certainly saved Greece from being immediately subjugated. It must have given Darius cause for thought, when he was forced to realise that the Greeks, or some of them, unstable, venal, treacherous and self-seeking though they were, were capable on occasion of fighting with great skill and superb courage. Ten years later, Xerxes was to learn the same lesson.
2. How did Xerxes demonstrate military ineptitude?
According to
the Greek historian, Herodotus, in the fifth century BC, described Xerxes’
thorough preparations and subsequent invasion of Greece in The Histories When he came to the throne, Xerxes was probably in
his early thirties. He wrote an inscription to commemorate his new position and
explained, as Darius had done, that he was supported by Ahura-Mazda:
“A great god is Ahura-Mazda, who created this earth, who created many man, who created peace for man, who made Xerxes king, one of king of many, one lord of many.
I am Xerxes, the great king, king of kings, king of lands containing many men, king in this great earth far and wide, son of Darius the king, an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of the Persian, an Aryan, of Aryan seed.”
Al Omtead, History of the Persian Empire, P231.
Herodotus tells us that Xerxes spent four years mustering troops and assembling provisions of stores and equipment. The Persian forces were recruited from all over the empire:
“There was not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against Greece… Some nations provided ships, others formed infantry units; from some cavalry was requisitioned, from others horse transports and crews; from others, again, warships for floating bridges, or provisions and naval craft of various kings.”
Herodotus, 7.23.
Large scale preparations were taking place on the Persian side. Cables were ordered which were to hold together two pontoon bridges across Hellespont. A canal was dug through the peninsula north of Mount Athos to avoid a repetition of the shipwrecks of 492 BC. Xerxes set off from Sardis in the May of 480 BC, his army so large that it took a week to cross the Hellespont. Once again, things had not gone smoothly, as Herodotus records:
“When the straight was bridged, a great storm blew up which smashed and destroyed everything. Leaning this, Xerxes was extremely angry, giving orders for three hundred lashes to be given to the Hellespont and iron fetters to be thrown into the sea. I have heard before now that he sent men to brand it at the same time.”
Herodotus, 7.34.
Thus, this source from Herodotus reinforces the dominant perspective of ancient historians as it explicitly details the possible amounts of insanity Xerxes displayed during this period of the Persian War. This account is reliable, as in this instance is free of the usual exaggeration presented by Herodotus, presents through the admittance of fear spent at the Hellespont, which corroborates with many other historians, such as Plutarch and Themistocles. The nucleus of the army was made up of Persians, Medes, Bactrian’s and the Sakas. Other nations provided troops but were given less important functions. The fleet was made up of ships and crews from Phoenicia, Egypt, Cyprus, Caria and Ionian Greeks. Troops and ships were used by Xerxes to carry out extensive and detailed preparations for his attack on Greece. Persia had already established control of most of the areas through which the army would have to march. There was no opposition in Thrace and Macedonia while the Persians made their preparations for the invasion of Greece. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent envoys to all the Greek states, except Athens and Sparta, demanding token of submission. Many of the states of northern and central Greece submitted to the Persians. This is not surprising considering their vulnerable position in the face of such a massive force. Even the Delphic Oracle was prophesying victory for Persia.
According to Herodotus, the size of Xerxes’ expeditionary force was over two million men and four thousand ships. Diodorus Siculus and Quintus Curtius Rufus confirm the enormity of Xerxes’ army, though their numbers differ from Herodotus and from each other, implying that there is there is no exact number of the army to be noted. It would have been to the Greeks’ advantage to exaggerate the size of the army that they finally defeated, to make the Greeks appear even more heroic. Originally, it would also have been Xerxes’ advantage to exaggerate the numbers, in order to frighten the Greeks. Whatever the actual numbers, the size of the army was astonishing. Herodotus describes it as being ‘far greater than any other in recorded history’.
The Greeks chose to defend the narrow pass at Thermopylae and to send the fleet to near Artemisium in an attempt to halt Xerxes’s advance by land and sea. The pass at Thermopylae had steep mountains on one side and in ancient times there was a steep drop to the sea on the other. This pass was so narrow that the Persians’ great advantage in numbers was reduced. They could only attack with a narrow front to meet heavily armed Greeks who had superior weapons for hand-to-hand combat. The Persian cavalry could not be deployed. Xerxes first sent Medes and Cissians into the pass, but they made no impression against the combined Greek force commanded by the Spartan king Leonidas. Xerxes then sent his famous Immortals against the Greeks, but they also failed. A third wave of Persians attacked the Greeks but again they were repulsed. According to Herodotus the naval battle of Artemisium was fought on the same three days as the Battle of Thermopylae. Before the fleets actually engaged in the battle, however, a severe storm had damaged up to one third of the Persian ships. After the storm, the Persian battle fleet sheltered at Aphetae, but fifteen ships accidently sailed past Aphetae and were captured by the Greeks. It seems that communications within the Persian fleet could have been better. Both Herodotus and Aeschylus exercise considerable ‘poetic licence’ in their depiction of the Persian navy and army making a hasty and disorderly retreat.
Despite indications of Persian strength, Xerxes decided to return to Persia. It is possible that the time of year was becoming unsuitable for campaigning, especially at sea. An eclipse of the sun may have been interpreted as an unfavourable omen. Perhaps Xerxes feared that news of Salamis would reach Ionia and encourage revolt. Whatever the reason, Xerxes withdrew the fleet and sent it to winter stations neat the Dardanelles and Ionia. Both Aeschylus and Herodotus present fairly ‘creative’ accounts of events after Salamis and unfortunately they have had considerable influence on the retelling of Xerxes’ retreat from Greece (Hurley, et al., 2008).
Dandamaev provides a perspective on the Persian and Greek disunity and the results of this:
“…at the decisive battles the forces on both sides were almost equally distributed, the Greeks had a better armament that the Persians; they also were superior to the Persians in fighting methods and military tactics. In addition, the Greeks fought in their own country, while the Persians had to deal with the greatest difficulties to provision their army. Contrary to general opinion, the Greeks were not united at all in the war against the Persians, and many districts of the country joined the invaders.”
Dandamaev, P225.
Xerxes gained submission from many Greek states, won the victory at Thermopylae and destroyed the Acropolis and city of Athens. Yet despite his meticulous planning and preparation and superiority in numbers of both troops and ships, the Persians were defeated at Salamis and Plataea and so failed to conquer Greece. Perhaps the sheer size of the multinational force became a problem once in combat in a hostile country, especially for supply and communications. Command may have been a problem in a force with such a large number of conscripts, particularly when key commanders were killed in battle. Timing may have been a problem; had Xerxes arrived in Greece a little earlier, he would have been able to stay to launch another attack soon after Salamis. With the benefit of experience gained in the first encounter, the outcome may have been different. Greek disunity had been apparent throughout the campaign and had been ably exploited by the Persians. Mardonius could not have anticipated the fierce determination of Athens to resist Persian domination, not the last minute decision of Sparta and her allies to stand with Athens at Plataea.
“The fact remains that the Greeks were saved at that time by their prowess at sea, and that is was these very triremes which won back the city of Athens after it had fallen. Xerxes’ own actions are the proof of this, and not the only one. For although his land forces were intact, he took to flight after the defeat of his ships because he believed that he was no longer a match for the Greeks, and he left being Mardonius, not, in my opinion, in the hope of subduing them, but of hindering their pursuit.”
Plutarch, Themistocles, 4.3, in I. Scott-Kilvert (translator), pp.80-81.
These sources represent the dominant perspective of the time. Plutarch also corroborates with sources of Herodotus, representing that the Persian Wars have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly endeavour. On particular element of discussion involves the search for the explanation as to how the massive Persian army came to be decisively defeated by a meagre federation of small city-states. It is unsatisfactory to take the ancient approach of Herodotus by merely placing the Greek forces as a superior fighting force or casting Xerxes as a foolish general who ruined the campaign. Taking a close look at both of the militaries involved before analysing the engagements and their consequences provides perspective on the military campaigning of Xerxes’ ruling as king. It is imperative to understand the military of both combatants before any analysis of the battles can be made for the sole reason that taking the usual conception of Xerxes’ large by poor army will lead to a misunderstanding of the engagements involved. Since the weakness of the Persian army has dominated so much of the reasoning behind the Persian defeat.
“A great god is Ahura-Mazda, who created this earth, who created many man, who created peace for man, who made Xerxes king, one of king of many, one lord of many.
I am Xerxes, the great king, king of kings, king of lands containing many men, king in this great earth far and wide, son of Darius the king, an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of the Persian, an Aryan, of Aryan seed.”
Al Omtead, History of the Persian Empire, P231.
Herodotus tells us that Xerxes spent four years mustering troops and assembling provisions of stores and equipment. The Persian forces were recruited from all over the empire:
“There was not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against Greece… Some nations provided ships, others formed infantry units; from some cavalry was requisitioned, from others horse transports and crews; from others, again, warships for floating bridges, or provisions and naval craft of various kings.”
Herodotus, 7.23.
Large scale preparations were taking place on the Persian side. Cables were ordered which were to hold together two pontoon bridges across Hellespont. A canal was dug through the peninsula north of Mount Athos to avoid a repetition of the shipwrecks of 492 BC. Xerxes set off from Sardis in the May of 480 BC, his army so large that it took a week to cross the Hellespont. Once again, things had not gone smoothly, as Herodotus records:
“When the straight was bridged, a great storm blew up which smashed and destroyed everything. Leaning this, Xerxes was extremely angry, giving orders for three hundred lashes to be given to the Hellespont and iron fetters to be thrown into the sea. I have heard before now that he sent men to brand it at the same time.”
Herodotus, 7.34.
Thus, this source from Herodotus reinforces the dominant perspective of ancient historians as it explicitly details the possible amounts of insanity Xerxes displayed during this period of the Persian War. This account is reliable, as in this instance is free of the usual exaggeration presented by Herodotus, presents through the admittance of fear spent at the Hellespont, which corroborates with many other historians, such as Plutarch and Themistocles. The nucleus of the army was made up of Persians, Medes, Bactrian’s and the Sakas. Other nations provided troops but were given less important functions. The fleet was made up of ships and crews from Phoenicia, Egypt, Cyprus, Caria and Ionian Greeks. Troops and ships were used by Xerxes to carry out extensive and detailed preparations for his attack on Greece. Persia had already established control of most of the areas through which the army would have to march. There was no opposition in Thrace and Macedonia while the Persians made their preparations for the invasion of Greece. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent envoys to all the Greek states, except Athens and Sparta, demanding token of submission. Many of the states of northern and central Greece submitted to the Persians. This is not surprising considering their vulnerable position in the face of such a massive force. Even the Delphic Oracle was prophesying victory for Persia.
According to Herodotus, the size of Xerxes’ expeditionary force was over two million men and four thousand ships. Diodorus Siculus and Quintus Curtius Rufus confirm the enormity of Xerxes’ army, though their numbers differ from Herodotus and from each other, implying that there is there is no exact number of the army to be noted. It would have been to the Greeks’ advantage to exaggerate the size of the army that they finally defeated, to make the Greeks appear even more heroic. Originally, it would also have been Xerxes’ advantage to exaggerate the numbers, in order to frighten the Greeks. Whatever the actual numbers, the size of the army was astonishing. Herodotus describes it as being ‘far greater than any other in recorded history’.
The Greeks chose to defend the narrow pass at Thermopylae and to send the fleet to near Artemisium in an attempt to halt Xerxes’s advance by land and sea. The pass at Thermopylae had steep mountains on one side and in ancient times there was a steep drop to the sea on the other. This pass was so narrow that the Persians’ great advantage in numbers was reduced. They could only attack with a narrow front to meet heavily armed Greeks who had superior weapons for hand-to-hand combat. The Persian cavalry could not be deployed. Xerxes first sent Medes and Cissians into the pass, but they made no impression against the combined Greek force commanded by the Spartan king Leonidas. Xerxes then sent his famous Immortals against the Greeks, but they also failed. A third wave of Persians attacked the Greeks but again they were repulsed. According to Herodotus the naval battle of Artemisium was fought on the same three days as the Battle of Thermopylae. Before the fleets actually engaged in the battle, however, a severe storm had damaged up to one third of the Persian ships. After the storm, the Persian battle fleet sheltered at Aphetae, but fifteen ships accidently sailed past Aphetae and were captured by the Greeks. It seems that communications within the Persian fleet could have been better. Both Herodotus and Aeschylus exercise considerable ‘poetic licence’ in their depiction of the Persian navy and army making a hasty and disorderly retreat.
Despite indications of Persian strength, Xerxes decided to return to Persia. It is possible that the time of year was becoming unsuitable for campaigning, especially at sea. An eclipse of the sun may have been interpreted as an unfavourable omen. Perhaps Xerxes feared that news of Salamis would reach Ionia and encourage revolt. Whatever the reason, Xerxes withdrew the fleet and sent it to winter stations neat the Dardanelles and Ionia. Both Aeschylus and Herodotus present fairly ‘creative’ accounts of events after Salamis and unfortunately they have had considerable influence on the retelling of Xerxes’ retreat from Greece (Hurley, et al., 2008).
Dandamaev provides a perspective on the Persian and Greek disunity and the results of this:
“…at the decisive battles the forces on both sides were almost equally distributed, the Greeks had a better armament that the Persians; they also were superior to the Persians in fighting methods and military tactics. In addition, the Greeks fought in their own country, while the Persians had to deal with the greatest difficulties to provision their army. Contrary to general opinion, the Greeks were not united at all in the war against the Persians, and many districts of the country joined the invaders.”
Dandamaev, P225.
Xerxes gained submission from many Greek states, won the victory at Thermopylae and destroyed the Acropolis and city of Athens. Yet despite his meticulous planning and preparation and superiority in numbers of both troops and ships, the Persians were defeated at Salamis and Plataea and so failed to conquer Greece. Perhaps the sheer size of the multinational force became a problem once in combat in a hostile country, especially for supply and communications. Command may have been a problem in a force with such a large number of conscripts, particularly when key commanders were killed in battle. Timing may have been a problem; had Xerxes arrived in Greece a little earlier, he would have been able to stay to launch another attack soon after Salamis. With the benefit of experience gained in the first encounter, the outcome may have been different. Greek disunity had been apparent throughout the campaign and had been ably exploited by the Persians. Mardonius could not have anticipated the fierce determination of Athens to resist Persian domination, not the last minute decision of Sparta and her allies to stand with Athens at Plataea.
“The fact remains that the Greeks were saved at that time by their prowess at sea, and that is was these very triremes which won back the city of Athens after it had fallen. Xerxes’ own actions are the proof of this, and not the only one. For although his land forces were intact, he took to flight after the defeat of his ships because he believed that he was no longer a match for the Greeks, and he left being Mardonius, not, in my opinion, in the hope of subduing them, but of hindering their pursuit.”
Plutarch, Themistocles, 4.3, in I. Scott-Kilvert (translator), pp.80-81.
These sources represent the dominant perspective of the time. Plutarch also corroborates with sources of Herodotus, representing that the Persian Wars have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly endeavour. On particular element of discussion involves the search for the explanation as to how the massive Persian army came to be decisively defeated by a meagre federation of small city-states. It is unsatisfactory to take the ancient approach of Herodotus by merely placing the Greek forces as a superior fighting force or casting Xerxes as a foolish general who ruined the campaign. Taking a close look at both of the militaries involved before analysing the engagements and their consequences provides perspective on the military campaigning of Xerxes’ ruling as king. It is imperative to understand the military of both combatants before any analysis of the battles can be made for the sole reason that taking the usual conception of Xerxes’ large by poor army will lead to a misunderstanding of the engagements involved. Since the weakness of the Persian army has dominated so much of the reasoning behind the Persian defeat.
3. How was Xerxes successful as a domestic administrator?
The empire
was a hereditary monarchy, a king who inherited the throne from his father. The
descendants of Achaemenes, the Achaemenids, formed the royal dynasty and ruled
by the grace of Ahura-Mazda. By placing Xerxes among the gods, this avows his
hero status as a “great king” and hence implies that he is renowned for his
great building accomplishments, particularly at Persepolis. The Great King was
not a god, but an absolute monarch, administering the realm from his palaces. Unfortunately,
there are few descriptions of Xerxes that are not from Greek sources, and these
were written under the influence of the Greek defeat of the Persian army under
Xerxes’ leadership. An inscription by Xerxes found near Persepolis is basically
a copy of Darius’ text at Naqsh-i Rustam. Xerxes tells us that he was
intelligent and active, a friend of the truth and a protector of the weak. He
could control his emotions and did not make hasty decisions. He was an
excellent warrior.
In appearance, he is shown as being tall, regal and handsome, where he cannot be distinguished from reliefs of his father. This would suggest that these ‘portraits’ are stock drawings to show an ideal of kingship rather than actual portraits of the individual kings. We have so little evidence of Xerxes’ earlier life that we can only speculate about the influences that moulded the king. We assume that he had administrative experience under his father, before becoming ruler of the empire. Cyrus, the first Persian king, established the administrative basis for the empire, but Darius, Xerxes’ father, perfected the system. The Persians inherited extensive bureaucracies from Babylon and Elam but developed them to suit their own diverse empire. The system Darius developed continued under Xerxes. Persian administration of their subjects was unusually tolerant and broad-minded. Subjected lands could follow their own customs and traditional forms of government, law and religion as long as they paid their taxes, obeyed the king and supplied troops when required. Xerxes did not meddle with the local political structures if they were efficient and loyal. The twenty or more satrapies were governed by satraps: ‘protectors of the realm or kingdom’. They represented the king and were directly responsible to him. The most important satrapies, such as Babylon, Egypt and Lydia, were often given to royal princes. Other satraps were Persian nobles and they often held the positions for life. Some positions were passed from father to son and so became hereditary.
The building program of Persian king became a measure of his power, influence and importance. It was concentrated on the major sites of the king’s courts and residents. Xerxes devoted a considerable portion of the empire’s wealth to his building program. The grandness of Persepolis is mostly due to Xerxes. As most of our ancient sources of Xerxes are Greek, it is difficult to make an unbiased assessment of rule. Obviously, because Xerxes invaded their country, Greek writers are generally hostile to him. Interpretations of both Old Persian and Babylonian texts re often disputed by modern scholars, adding to our difficulties. We can be sure that early in his reign, Xerxes dealt swiftly and successfully with revolts in Egypt and Babylon. His preparations for the invasion of Greece were thorough and ravaged the Greek countryside and were burned in revenge for the Greeks’ burning the temple of Cybele at Sardis during the Ionian Revolt. While the Greek victory against Persia was a great achievement and has been given epic status by Greek historians, it seems that the Persians did not attach the same significance to it: the Persians did not regard themselves as having been defeated. If Darius or Xerxes had succeeded in overrunning Greece, the subsequent history of the West would have been very different.
There are several positives and negative features of Xerxes’ domestic administration. Up until the domestic intrigues, which eventually led to Xerxes’ bloody assassination, evidence suggests that Xerxes was a sound ruler. In general, Herodotus’ description of the administrative management of the court and the empire gives the impression the Xerxes was a capable ruler. This conclusion is based on evidence of Xerxes’ satrapal appointments form the royal family, including the appointment of his brother, Achaemenes, to Egypt. Additionally, Xerxes’ appointments of Persian and Median nobility to army, navy and cavalry commands indicate Xerxes skilfully handled the domestic administration of the empire. Finally, Xerxes’ willingness to consult his nobles and members of the court when serious decisions are to be made indicates that Xerxes was not unreasonably autocratic. Such consultations, according to Herodotus, occurred before the invasion of Greece, and before attacking the Greeks at Salamis.
Dandamaev corroborates with historians, such as Herodotus, on the influence of the war against the Persians and the Greeks:
“What was the influence of the Persian-Greek wars on the Persians? ... There is no doubt that the Persians… did not regard themselves as being defeated, because the previously proclaimed objectives had been accomplished: Athens had been taken twice; the Eretrians were taken away in captivity. The real objective of the war was of course different: under the pretext of a punitive expedition against Athens, the Persians wanted to occupy all of Greece.”
M. A. Dandamaev, A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, Brill, Leiden, 1989, PP225-226
Thus, Xerxes handled the domestic administration of the Persian Empire with astuteness, whether it is concerning matters within the empire or outside its borders. It was only towards the end of Xerxes’ reign, when Xerxes had effectively retired to Persepolis that his handling of the domestic administration was not done intelligently. After the Greek invasion, Xerxes took no more interest in military matters and lived a life of luxury while focusing his attention on his building program at Persepolis. In Xerxes’ final three years, he built more than Darius did in his entire reign as king. Xerxes failed to interest himself in the empire’s affairs and left the day to day running of the empire to Artabanus, the Hazarapat, which undermined Xerxes’ position. Xerxes’ neglect in managing the domestic administration made the empire suffer and become unstable. Herodotus learned much about Persia from the family of the exiled Spartan king, Demaratos, who may have been in Xerxes’ favour at the time of the invasion. Another possible source of knowledge of the Persian Empire comes from Zopyros, the great-grandson of Megabyzos, who was responsible for the accusation of Darius to the Persian throne. Herodotus’ work is the basis of all modern studies of the Persian Wars. The Greek playwright Aeschylus, though not a historian, is the author of another of the sources used in reference for the Persian Wars. The central theme of his play ‘The Persians’ (472 BCE) is that Xerxes’ attempt to conquer Greece was doomed to fail.
The instability of the Empire was furthered by the domestic intrigues, which eventually led to the assassination of Xerxes. The second domestic intrigue led to death of Xerxes in 465 BC. Xerxes apparently caused such discontent among several of his officials that they conspired to kill him. Ctesias recounts that Artabanus “decided to slay Xerxes and transfer the kingship to himself”. Artabanus and Aspametres murdered Xerxes and told his son Artaxerxes that Darius had killed him. When Darius was killed Artaxerxes claimed the throne and managed to kill Artabanus when he tried to stab him. Aristotle claims that Xerxes’ son Darius was murdered first, and Artabanus murdered Xerxes in fear. Regardless, it was Xerxes’ mishandling of the domestic administration at this point that contributed to his death. Therefore, while there were many positive features of Xerxes’ domestic administration throughout his reign, his misjudgements led to domestic intrigues, which were a result of his poor handling of the domestic administration.
In appearance, he is shown as being tall, regal and handsome, where he cannot be distinguished from reliefs of his father. This would suggest that these ‘portraits’ are stock drawings to show an ideal of kingship rather than actual portraits of the individual kings. We have so little evidence of Xerxes’ earlier life that we can only speculate about the influences that moulded the king. We assume that he had administrative experience under his father, before becoming ruler of the empire. Cyrus, the first Persian king, established the administrative basis for the empire, but Darius, Xerxes’ father, perfected the system. The Persians inherited extensive bureaucracies from Babylon and Elam but developed them to suit their own diverse empire. The system Darius developed continued under Xerxes. Persian administration of their subjects was unusually tolerant and broad-minded. Subjected lands could follow their own customs and traditional forms of government, law and religion as long as they paid their taxes, obeyed the king and supplied troops when required. Xerxes did not meddle with the local political structures if they were efficient and loyal. The twenty or more satrapies were governed by satraps: ‘protectors of the realm or kingdom’. They represented the king and were directly responsible to him. The most important satrapies, such as Babylon, Egypt and Lydia, were often given to royal princes. Other satraps were Persian nobles and they often held the positions for life. Some positions were passed from father to son and so became hereditary.
The building program of Persian king became a measure of his power, influence and importance. It was concentrated on the major sites of the king’s courts and residents. Xerxes devoted a considerable portion of the empire’s wealth to his building program. The grandness of Persepolis is mostly due to Xerxes. As most of our ancient sources of Xerxes are Greek, it is difficult to make an unbiased assessment of rule. Obviously, because Xerxes invaded their country, Greek writers are generally hostile to him. Interpretations of both Old Persian and Babylonian texts re often disputed by modern scholars, adding to our difficulties. We can be sure that early in his reign, Xerxes dealt swiftly and successfully with revolts in Egypt and Babylon. His preparations for the invasion of Greece were thorough and ravaged the Greek countryside and were burned in revenge for the Greeks’ burning the temple of Cybele at Sardis during the Ionian Revolt. While the Greek victory against Persia was a great achievement and has been given epic status by Greek historians, it seems that the Persians did not attach the same significance to it: the Persians did not regard themselves as having been defeated. If Darius or Xerxes had succeeded in overrunning Greece, the subsequent history of the West would have been very different.
There are several positives and negative features of Xerxes’ domestic administration. Up until the domestic intrigues, which eventually led to Xerxes’ bloody assassination, evidence suggests that Xerxes was a sound ruler. In general, Herodotus’ description of the administrative management of the court and the empire gives the impression the Xerxes was a capable ruler. This conclusion is based on evidence of Xerxes’ satrapal appointments form the royal family, including the appointment of his brother, Achaemenes, to Egypt. Additionally, Xerxes’ appointments of Persian and Median nobility to army, navy and cavalry commands indicate Xerxes skilfully handled the domestic administration of the empire. Finally, Xerxes’ willingness to consult his nobles and members of the court when serious decisions are to be made indicates that Xerxes was not unreasonably autocratic. Such consultations, according to Herodotus, occurred before the invasion of Greece, and before attacking the Greeks at Salamis.
Dandamaev corroborates with historians, such as Herodotus, on the influence of the war against the Persians and the Greeks:
“What was the influence of the Persian-Greek wars on the Persians? ... There is no doubt that the Persians… did not regard themselves as being defeated, because the previously proclaimed objectives had been accomplished: Athens had been taken twice; the Eretrians were taken away in captivity. The real objective of the war was of course different: under the pretext of a punitive expedition against Athens, the Persians wanted to occupy all of Greece.”
M. A. Dandamaev, A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire, Brill, Leiden, 1989, PP225-226
Thus, Xerxes handled the domestic administration of the Persian Empire with astuteness, whether it is concerning matters within the empire or outside its borders. It was only towards the end of Xerxes’ reign, when Xerxes had effectively retired to Persepolis that his handling of the domestic administration was not done intelligently. After the Greek invasion, Xerxes took no more interest in military matters and lived a life of luxury while focusing his attention on his building program at Persepolis. In Xerxes’ final three years, he built more than Darius did in his entire reign as king. Xerxes failed to interest himself in the empire’s affairs and left the day to day running of the empire to Artabanus, the Hazarapat, which undermined Xerxes’ position. Xerxes’ neglect in managing the domestic administration made the empire suffer and become unstable. Herodotus learned much about Persia from the family of the exiled Spartan king, Demaratos, who may have been in Xerxes’ favour at the time of the invasion. Another possible source of knowledge of the Persian Empire comes from Zopyros, the great-grandson of Megabyzos, who was responsible for the accusation of Darius to the Persian throne. Herodotus’ work is the basis of all modern studies of the Persian Wars. The Greek playwright Aeschylus, though not a historian, is the author of another of the sources used in reference for the Persian Wars. The central theme of his play ‘The Persians’ (472 BCE) is that Xerxes’ attempt to conquer Greece was doomed to fail.
The instability of the Empire was furthered by the domestic intrigues, which eventually led to the assassination of Xerxes. The second domestic intrigue led to death of Xerxes in 465 BC. Xerxes apparently caused such discontent among several of his officials that they conspired to kill him. Ctesias recounts that Artabanus “decided to slay Xerxes and transfer the kingship to himself”. Artabanus and Aspametres murdered Xerxes and told his son Artaxerxes that Darius had killed him. When Darius was killed Artaxerxes claimed the throne and managed to kill Artabanus when he tried to stab him. Aristotle claims that Xerxes’ son Darius was murdered first, and Artabanus murdered Xerxes in fear. Regardless, it was Xerxes’ mishandling of the domestic administration at this point that contributed to his death. Therefore, while there were many positive features of Xerxes’ domestic administration throughout his reign, his misjudgements led to domestic intrigues, which were a result of his poor handling of the domestic administration.